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Abstract 
Objectives. A new theory of personality is presented. The A-TRiC is unique in having a substantive theoretical basis in 
human evolutionary history and the phylogenetic constraints on development of dimensional psychological traits. Trust, 
Reactivity (to threat) and (need for) Control are personality traits found in all social mammals. Independence affects need 
for social reward, Analytical Thinking affects willingness to adhere to mechanistic/reductionistic vs intuitive/holistic 
explanations to phenomena. Since it would be futile academic egotism to propose a new theory unless one is needed, the 
psychometric and theoretical problems of the mainstream Five-Factor theory are also analysed. 
Methods. 1027 participants (61% female; Mage 41) completed the A-TRiC questionnaire online. Internal consistencies of 
the traits and model fit were investigated and predictions about traits and some outcomes were tested. 
Results & conclusions. Internal consistency was acceptable. Central model fit indices showed acceptable to poor fit. 
Levels of Reactivity and Control were associated with lifetime diagnoses of depression and anxiety. Reactivity was 
associated with addiction. High scores in Analytical thinking were associated with male gender and a degree in natural 
science. Women scored higher on Control. Some conceptual confusions hindering progress in the scientific study of 
personality are discussed in light of the theory and its background assumptions. 
 
 
Sammanfattning 
Avsikt. En ny personlighetsteori presenteras. A-TRiC är unik i att den har en substantiv teoretisk bas i människans 
evolutionshistoria och beaktar de fylogenetiska begränsingar som berör utvecklingen av dimensionella psykologiska 
egenskaper såsom personlighetsdrag. Tillit, Reaktivitet och Kontrollbehov är de dimensioner vi har gemensamt med alla 
andra sociala däggdjur. Självständighet påverkar behovet av social belöning, medan Analytiskt Tänkade påverkar viljan att 
anamma mekanistisk-reduktionistiska eller intuitiva-holistiska förklaringsmodeller. Eftersom det vore akademisk egotism att 
formulera en teori om det inte fanns behov för en sådan, analyseras även den gällande femfaktorteorins psykometriska och 
teoretiska problem. 
Metoder. 1027 deltagare (61% kvinnor; Målder 41) gjorde A-TRiC-personlighetstestet på nätet. Testets interna konsistens 
och modellanpassning utvärderades och vissa förutsagda effekter av personlighetsdragen testades. 
Resultat & slutledningar. Dimensionernas interna konsistens var acceptabel. Centrala modellanpassningsindex indikerade 
acceptabel till svag modellanpassning. Reaktivitets- och Kontrollbehovsnivån var associerade med diagnosticerad 
depression och ångest. Reaktivitetsnivån var associerad med beroende. Högre nivå av Analytiskt Tänkande var associerad 
med manligt kön och studier i naturvetenskap. Kontrollbehovet var högre hos kvinnor. Vissa konceptuella oklarheter som 
hindrar vetenskapliga framsteg inom personlighetspsykologin diskuteras i ljuset av teorin och dess bakgrundsantaganden. 
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“Scientists work from models acquired through education and through 
subsequent exposure to the literature, often without quite knowing or 
needing to know what characteristics have given these models the status 
of community paradigms” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 46) 
 
“Daher ist die Aufgabe nicht sowohl zu sehen was noch keiner gesehen 
hat, als bei dem was Jeder sieht, zu denken was noch Keiner gedacht hat.” 
(Schopenhauer, 1851, p. 93) 
 
1. Introduction 
Personality is a fascinating subject. Our individual differences have been discussed at campfires, 
bars, offices and universities ever since there has existed a language with which to do so. The one 
thing that we do not know, despite millennia of human pondering and a century of professional 
psychological theorizing, is the true structure of personality. What are the basic, indivisible, 
independent and immutable traits that give rise to our individual differences? 
Many seem content with the situation as it is. There are hundreds of tests purporting to measure 
aspects of personality, and these are used every day in research departments and businesses around 
the world. There even exists a kind of consensus claiming we in fact know the structure of 
personality. A majority of journal editors and authors of textbooks and, as a result, teachers at 
psychology departments, believe the Five-Factor Model and its sibling the Big Five (henceforth 
referred to as FFM/B5) accurately and comprehensively describe personality. For decades, 
psychologists have graduated believing human personality consists of five broad traits, each 
composed of six sub-traits. 
According to the FFM/B5, personality is a hierarchical construct, where five domains causally affect 
how a person is placed on 30 facets. The domains are named Neuroticism (Emotional Stability in B5), 
Extraversion, Openness to Experience (Intellect in B5), Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. In 
practice, questionnaire items measure the facets, and by summing scores from the six facets 
belonging to a domain, one’s placement on the domain dimension is determined. There are 
differences in descriptions and names of the domains, but mainly FFM and B5 tests differ in that 
the former often use items consisting of whole sentences like I would enjoy spending my holiday at a 
casino, whereas B5 tests mostly use lists of adjectives. Both types of tests use Likert scales for 
scoring.  
The full-length NEO-PI-R and its newer, linguistically simplified version NEO-PI-3 consist of 240 
items, eight for each facet (Costa & McCrae, 1992; McCrae, Martin & Costa, 2005). According to 
Hofmans, Kuppens and Allik (2008), the NEO-PI-R is the most comprehensive instrument 
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available for measuring the FFM/B5 and by 2017 it had been translated to at least 37 languages and 
used in at least 60 countries or cultures (Allik et al., 2017).  
The most popular short version, and the test usually used in research settings is the NEO-FFI 
(NEO Five Factor Inventory) and its newer versions NEO-FFI-R and NEO-FFI-3. The FFI 
questionnaires consist of 12 items per domain, chosen from the full-length questionnaires, and they 
only provide results on the domain level. In fact, the FFI items were not chosen to represent all 
facets equally, but according to how well they correlated with their domains in the American 
normative sample for NEO-PI-R (McCrae & Costa, 2004). As a result, the NEO-FFI domain 
Neuroticism has no items from facet N5 Impulsiveness, Agreeableness has none from A5 Modesty 
and Conscientiousness none from C1 Competence or C6 Deliberation (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
Despite its popularity and widespread use, the FFM/B5 is fraught with both psychometric and, 
more worryingly, theoretical problems. In this thesis it is suggested that we still haven’t carved 
human nature at its joints and that the current consensus theory is not a valid model of personality. 
First, psychometric evidence from existing research will be provided along with theoretical 
arguments to convince the reader, that there is indeed something askew with the emperor’s garb. 
The psychometric critique will mainly concentrate on results obtained using NEO-PI-R in its 
different guises, as it is the key operationalisation of FFM/B5. Finally, a new model of personality, 
based on substantive theory and focused on what kinds of traits could have evolved in our species, 
is presented. 
 
1.1 Psychometric problems of FFM/B5 
When confronted with the model’s theoretical shortcomings (see section 1.2) FFM/B5 advocates 
appeal to its wide acceptance and practical usefulness. Implicitly it is assumed and sometimes 
explicitly stated (McCrae & Costa, 1997), that the traits are universal and that they predict many 
important real-life outcomes (e.g. Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). 
The claims about the practical usefulness and universal acceptance of FFM/B5 are certainly true. 
NEO-PI-R and its shorter versions are arguably the best-selling tests that aim to measure normal 
personality, and as research using them tends to get accepted for publication, it is useful for 
academic psychologists also. These facts, however, have no bearing on the validity of the theoretical 
assumptions behind FFM/B5 nor on the verisimilitude of the alleged personality traits, which are 
the two scientifically relevant issues. 
The claim about universality (e.g. Allik, 2002) turns out to be exaggerated. Church, Alvarez, Mai, 
French & Katigbak (2011) showed that around 40-50% of NEO-PI-R items show differential item 
functioning in samples from the United States, the Philippines and Mexico, and average inter-item 
3 
 
correlations within facets ranged from .04 to .23 in the Mexican sample. Among forager-farmers in 
Bolivia, the five factors didn’t emerge at all (Gurven, von Rueden, Massenkoff, Kaplan & Vie, 2013). 
Average within-domain correlations ranged from .05 for Neuroticism to .19 for Conscientiousness, 
while cross-correlations among domains ranged from .29 to .60 (Gurven et al., 2013). There was no 
difference among Spanish-speakers and those speaking the indigenous language, nor between the 
educated and non-educated (Gurven et al., 2013). In other studies, the NEO-PI-R domains 
Agreeableness and Extraversion have proved to be most inconsistent cross-culturally (reviewed in 
Rolland, 2002). 
1.1.1 Predictive powers 
Claims have been made that the FFM/B5 predicts diverse outcomes ranging from job performance 
(Barrick & Mount, 1991) to eating disorders (De Bolle et al., 2011). Looking closer at the 
correlations between test and outcome, it becomes less a case of trait predicting outcome and more 
a case of single items and outcome measures being identical or defined by the same criteria. For 
example, De Bolle et al. (2011) found that Neuroticism, and specifically its facet Impulsiveness 
predicted binge-eating and differentiated between anorexic and bulimic patients. This is not 
surprising, as six out of eight items from the Impulsiveness facet deal with inability to control 
cravings, and two of those are specifically about eating too much at a time (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
Item-level analyses of the NEO-PI-R are seldom performed, but they can be informative. A study 
by Terraciano, Costa and McCrae (2009) shows, that there is an association between Neuroticism 
and being overweight, but only due to correlations between body-mass index and the two 
Impulsiveness items concerned with eating too much.  
Associations between Extraversion or Neuroticism and life satisfaction and feelings of well-being 
also may be seen as somewhat trivial, since they are only due to facets E6 Positive Emotions and N3 
Depression (Schimmack, Oishi, Furr & Funder, 2004). Even for more obvious associations, like 
between job performance and Conscientiousness, the predictive power can be quite small. In a 
meta-analysis by Barrick and Mount (1991), Conscientiousness was deemed a valid predictor of job 
performance with an average correlation of .13 between Conscientiousness scores and three 
indicators of performance in 117 studies. 
To sum it up, the predictive power is often due to single items that describe the outcomes 
themselves. In line with this are results that show the superiority of facets over domains as 
predictors of behavioural outcomes (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). As long as the correlation between 
domain and outcome is lower than the correlation between items (or facets) and outcome, the 
parsimonious explanation is that the domain-outcome correlation is largely an artefact. This applies 
to reflective models like FFM/B5, where domains are seen as causes of variations in lower level 
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variables, which, by definition, are supposedly imperfect indicators of domain function (Mõttus, 
2016).  
1.1.2 Internal consistency 
Facet-level Cronbach’s alphas of NEO PI-R were on average .71 (range .50 to .82) in a sample of 
12,156 (McCrae, Kurtz, Yamagata & Terraciano, 2011). This translates to an average within-facet 
correlation of .24 (range .13 to .35). In the newest version, NEO-PI-3, McCrae, Costa and Martin 
(2005) altered 37 items to improve readability, but this led to no improvement in average Cronbach’s 
alpha in their study sample (McCrae & Costa, 2010). In a Greek sample, average facet-level alpha for 
NEO-PI-3 was .59 with a range from .30 to .73 (Fountoulakis et al., 2014). This translates to an 
average inter-item correlation of .15 within the facets. 
Mullins-Sweatt, Jamerson, Samuel, Olson and Widiger (2006) looked at how facet scores correlated 
in FFMRF, an abbreviated version of NEO-PI-R, where each facet is measured by a list of 
adjectives instead of eight items. In their sample, Warmth (E1) had higher cross-correlations with 
four Agreeableness facets (.22-.41) than its average correlation (.20) with other facets of 
Extraversion. Impulsiveness (N5) had an average correlation of .19 with other Neuroticism facets, 
whereas its cross-correlation with Self-discipline (C5) was -.27 and with Order (C2) -.22. The same 
discrepancy applied to correlations between Self-Consciousness (N4) and Gregariousness (E2), and 
between Depression (N3) and Action (E4), and between Depression (N3) and Positive Emotions 
(E6).  
These results are informative, as the FFMRF unmasks truer associations between facets because it 
doesn’t have redundant items like NEO-PI-R, where near-identical items “weigh down” the facets. 
Two items that do not differ in their semantic content will, through summing, account for four 
times the variance compared to a single item. Such items artificially inflate internal consistency 
at the facet-level (Clark & Watson, 1995).  
For example, there are five items in facet C6 Deliberation, which are about making hasty decisions 
and three in C5 Self-discipline about getting things done*. Two items from E1 Warmth refer to 
getting pleasure from talking with people and two from E2 Gregariousness refer to enjoying being 
among lots of people. Pairs of semantically near-identical items can also be found in N6 
Vulnerability, N5 Impulsiveness, as well as three items about easily losing one’s temper in N2 Angry 
Hostility. 
Likewise, near-identical items form “bridges” between facets belonging to the same domain, thereby 
artificially inflating internal consistency at the domain level. One example is a pair of items 
                                                          
* Items from the commercial NEO tests may not be reproduced verbatim for proprietary reasons. 
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about having control over one’s emotions from N5 Impulsiveness and N6 Vulnerability, 
respectively. Another bridge is formed by two items about feeling inferior from N3 Depression and 
N4 Self-Consciousness. There are further bridges between C1 Competence and C2 Order (about 
being organized) and between A4 Cooperation and A6 Empathy, too (about being hard-headed).  
Correlations between the supposedly independent domains are substantial, except for Openness, 
which does seem independent from all but Extraversion. For the remaining four domains, van der 
Linden, te Nijenhuis and Bakker (2010) found average cross-correlations ranging in absolute value 
from .38 to .51 for NEO-FFI and from .22 to .68 for NEO-PI-R in a meta-analysis of studies with a 
total of 144,117 subjects.  
In two large samples from Switzerland and Spain, average inter-item correlation within domains was 
.20 for the NEO-FFI-R (Aluja, Garcia, Rossier & Garcia, 2005). This average within-domain 
correlation was lower than the average across-domain correlation in another study using NEO-FFI-
R (McCrae & Costa, 2004). 
1.1.3 Why so inconsistent? 
A reason for the inconsistent structure of FFM/B5 tests might be a wish to have tests where scores 
correlate with diverse real-life outcomes. If the FFM/B5 tests do not measure true personality traits, 
then the only way to achieve this goal is to include items that directly describe the outcomes, and 
just accept the poor psychometrics. Indeed, the NEO-PI-R does contain items very similar to items 
on diagnostic tests like Beck’s Depression Inventory and Eating Disorder Examination-
Questionnaire and items that are trivially predictive of outcomes in the educational and industrial-
organizational settings, like those that make up the Conscientiousness facets Achievement-Striving, 
Self-Discipline, Competence and Dutifulness. 
This hypothetical explanation is corroborated by how McCrae, one of the authors of the NEO tests, 
justifies the inclusion of items with poor correlations in the same facet (italics added): 
“[One of the] Angry Hostility items concerns feelings of bitterness and resentment; another concerns 
being hot-blooded and quick-tempered. These are clearly related affective dispositions (they are characteristic 
negative emotions prompted by and focused on the perceived hostile actions of others).” (McCrae, 
2015, p. 6). 
It is also theoretically conceivable, that bitterness (an internalizing, situational emotion) and a quick 
temper (externalizing and constitutional) would not have much to do with each other apart from 
being subjectively negative emotional states. So why include these measures into one facet when 
they do not correlate? To McCrae, the answer is practical usefulness:  
“An Angry Hostility scale consisting solely of bitterness items would in fact be a Bitterness scale and 
a relatively poor predictor of, say, spouse ratings of temper tantrums.” (McCrae, 2015, p. 7). 
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McCrae believes that aiming for internal consistency only leads to a “selection of items that 
essentially ask the same question again and again” (McCrae, 2015, p. 7), but the more parsimonious 
explanation for the lack of internal consistency is that neither domains nor facets are true, coherent 
traits and, therefore, items that measure them will not correlate, unless made essentially identical. 
McCrae (2015) further justifies the heterogenous structure of domains and their low internal 
consistencies with their usefulness as predictors. He mentions that having a facet for Positive 
Emotions, E6, makes Extraversion a better predictor of emotional well-being than one without it. 
This is true. The scientifically relevant issue, however, is the test-independent existence of a trait that 
causes a predisposition to both exuberant expressions of joy (E6 Positive Emotions) and a wish to 
be a leader of others (E3 Assertiveness).  
Due to the large cross-correlations and low internal correlations, the FFM/B5 test results will also 
lend themselves to several other psychometric interpretations: There will be two super-traits above 
the domains (Digman, 1997), or just one General Personality Factor (Rushton, Bons, & Hur, 2008); 
there will be intermediate traits between facets and domains (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007; 
Judge, Rodell, Klinger, Simon & Crawford, 2013) and between facets and items (McCrae, 2015). The 
structure also easily splits into more than five domains, as in the HEXACO model (Ashton & Lee, 
2007).  
And as Cattell noted, it makes no difference how trait words are lumped together; in the end they 
will all end up flowing into each other in a “continuous, straggling network” (1943, p. 498). Such 
continuity can be conceptualized as a circular structure, like the AB5C (Hofstee, de Raad, Goldberg, 
1992).  
 
1.2 Theoretical problems of the FFM/B5 
The lexical hypothesis is often given as the theoretical basis of the FFM/B5. A closer look at 
historical events (Appendix 1) makes it evident that the lexical hypothesis was not instrumental in 
formulating the FFM/B5. The five traits were uncovered using subjectively chosen parts of 
Raymond Cattell’s trait catalogue, which in turn was formed from a subjectively pruned list, 
consisting of less than 10% of the original 4504 trait words chosen from the lexicon, and into which 
new words were added during the process. But a more relevant question is: Had we arrived at a valid 
description of human personality structure, had the pioneers followed the lexical hypothesis 
religiously? I believe not. 
The lexical hypothesis states, that words for important individual differences will be encoded in 
natural language. All that is needed is to find out how these words cluster together when people 
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describe each other and themselves, and at the semantic centres of such clusters will be the essences 
of the traits that make up personality. 
This is where the lexical hypothesis goes astray. Language is not a repository of information 
describing the structure of reality, but a tool for, in equal measures, social communication and 
manipulation (e.g. Oesch, 2016). During most of human history – before the advent of job 
interviews and psychotherapy – people had very little reason to describe themselves to strangers. 
Words accumulating in language would therefore be those we use to describe third parties and, 
specifically, their dependability or deviousness, their kindness or cruelty, their boldness or 
cowardice, their skills and abilities – in short, their potential worth in cooperative endeavours and as 
mates. The words will therefore be evaluative and those describing negative behaviours will be more 
abundant, since potentially harmful behaviour is more important to be aware of than harmless 
behaviour (Pratto & John, 1991). When Louis Thurstone performed some of the first factor analyses 
of trait words ever, he indeed observed that “the largest constellation of traits consists of derogatory 
adjectives” (Thurstone, 1934, p. 16). 
So, what does the FFM/B5 measure, if not personality? Even given their somewhat amorphous 
consistency, the traits do reflect something in people. As described above, the words which filtered 
into the five proto-factors, were evaluative and overwhelmingly negative. Much work was done to 
rid the subsequent tests of words that were too judgmental, but still the factors have a clear good-
bad -dimensionality: It is better to be agreeable and gentle than disagreeable and headstrong. It is 
better to be responsible and persevering than undependable and fickle. Poised and calm is better 
than tense and anxious, and a sociable, active and assertive person is better than a passive recluse. 
It is conceivable, therefore, that the FFM/B5 measures a near-universal way in which people tend to 
evaluate other people (and by extension, describe themselves). Neuroticism might be an exception 
and instead reflect the subjective choices of adjectives made by clinically minded psychologists 
during the evolution of the FFM/B5 (see Appendix 1). The factors will likely capture slivers of 
single personality traits and parts of combinations of traits, but the focus is on what is useful to 
know about others, and there is no reason such evaluative dimensions should coincide with the 
basic, independent personality traits. 
As McArthur and Baron (1983) concluded, our perception is adaptive; we perceive and encode into 
language those aspects of reality which are useful for our survival and reproduction. There is no 
more reason to believe that natural language contains the keys to delineating personality traits, than 
there is to believe that language is the key to understanding electromagnetic radiation. Still, the 
lexical hypothesis has been almost universally accepted as a basis for personality theory. Even 
among those who readily admit that the FFM/B5 structure is flawed, most suggest that personality 
traits should be looked for in language (e.g. Boyle, 2008).  
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Scientists in other disciplines have been able to see beyond the surface of phenomena, beyond that 
which is merely expressed in natural language, and there is no reason why psychologists should not 
strive to do the same. Therefore, I suggest that the lexicon is not the place to look for personality. 
The place to start should be our evolutionary history and universal mammalian personality traits. 
 
1.3 The A-TRiC 
When constructing a scientific theory, it is important to define one’s terms unambiguously and to 
make explicit the underlying assumptions the theory takes for granted. These requirements are 
sometimes overlooked in the study of personality and other softer disciplines within psychology. We 
are inclined to “move the goalposts” to accommodate new data instead of formulating theories in a 
scientifically rigorous manner and discarding them when they are refuted or when a better theory 
comes along (e.g. Meehl, 1978; 1986). To avoid this mistake, a modified definition of personality and 
the underlying assumptions of the A-TRiC model will be given below. 
1.3.1 The definition of personality 
One of the challenges in determining the structure of personality is keeping apart that, which is 
innate and unchanging and that, which is plastic and situational. In most current definitions, 
personality includes behaviour, as in Pervin and John’s “a person’s consistent patterns of feeling, 
thinking, and behaving” (1997, p. 4) or Funder’s “an individual’s characteristic patterns of thought, 
emotion, and behaviour” (2004, p. 5). This makes for so broad a construct, that it has led some to 
lose heart and conclude that there is no personality (Lamiel, 1981), or at least that situational factors 
trump any constitutional traits and that, in the end, all human behaviour is dependent on 
environment only (Wright & Mischel, 1987). I concur with Hofstee, de Raad and Goldberg in that 
“all of humankind does not provide sufficient degrees of freedom to determine the behavioral effects 
[of personality]” (1992, p. 162, italics added). I sympathize with these researchers’ frustration and 
believe it is indeed futile to look for personality in behaviour. Not because there is no personality or 
because it has no effect on behaviour, but because behaviour is only a distant echo of it – a 
complicated function of situation, culture, life history, social learning and personality. The one thing 
we cannot choose according to social setting and culture, however, is our emotional response. 
According to A-TRiC, therefore, the valence and strength of emotional responses are the true 
essence of personality. Or, more correctly, the closest thing we can come to the true essence, which 
is individual neuroanatomy and synaptic dynamics. 
For the purposes of my theory, personality is therefore defined as innate, inter-individually varied 
intra-individually stable emotional responses to certain types of situations. Being innate does not mean that 
the trait is manifest from birth, only that its development is genetically hardwired and that it is 
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immune to environmental influences once its neurophysiological development is finished. So, 
innateness does not preclude the possibility that the neural architecture responsible for the trait is 
susceptible to environmental influences during so-called sensitive periods, when network 
architecture goes through genetically programmed changes (Knudsen, 2004). That the emotional 
reaction is hardwired, does not mean that it leads to identical behaviour in all instances. Excluding 
extreme situations, behaviour and expression of emotions are very much influenced by learning and 
cultural expectations (e.g. Ekman, 1972), which is why attempting to map typical behaviour is a 
blunt instrument when measuring personality traits. 
Importantly, a personality trait is a continuum along which individuals consistently differ from each 
other as to the valence and strength of their emotional response to certain stimuli. For each trait, 
therefore, there exists a specific stimulus space. The stimulus space refers to the sum total of types of 
situations where a trait becomes activated. To delineate this stimulus space is as important as 
determining the emotions involved in the expression of each trait, and it is also the hardest part of 
the endeavour. 
1.3.2 The underlying assumptions of the A-TRiC 
To assess the prior probability of a theory, it is essential to know all its underlying assumptions. 
These are propositions which connect the theory to its nomological net; they are assumed to be true 
and not put to the test. In the words of Daniel Kahneman: “The errors of a theory are rarely to be 
found in what it asserts explicitly; they hide in what it ignores or tacitly assumes.” (Kahneman, 2012, 
p. 274).  
The FFM/B5 has one underlying assumption: that natural language contains words that reveal the 
structure of personality when they are combined into clusters of synonyms according to how people 
use them when describing themselves or others. The A-TRiC is based on three assumptions, 
outlined below. These are considered beyond reasonable doubt in their respective disciplines, but 
they need to be stated explicitly, as some theories within psychology implicitly assume they are either 
irrelevant to the study of the human mind, or not even true. 
The first assumption is that all conscious experience like grieving, rejoicing, hating, fearing, 
thinking, remembering, problem-solving, sensing, planning, suffering, loving, hurting, perceiving and 
yearning, is brain activity. From this follows, that identical activity within a certain combination of 
neural networks is always equal to the same conscious experience, as there is no other way to 
account for different “contents/states of mind” than as activities in different populations of 
neurons. Therefore, differences in the architecture of neural networks and the way information 
flows through them, is what makes one individual mind different from another. This naturally 
doesn’t apply to personality only, but also to how the brain solves problems, how it holds 
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information active in working memory, how it produces behaviour and retains information in long-
term memory and how it activates those memories, and so on. 
The second assumption is that the activity of proteins in brain cells is governed by the same causal 
laws as the activities of proteins in other cells of the body; that there exists no immaterial entity able 
to causally affect their activity, i.e., there is no soul, no free will, no one “using the brain”. (This 
assumption should not be confused with the fact that all neurologically normal humans have an 
absolutely certain experience of having free will.) Some hypothesise there exists a “systemic level” that 
causes the brain to act in non-determined ways (Mannino & Bressler 2015). No one has yet clarified 
what a systemic level is, or how it could affect the workings of neurons and the networks they form, 
in ways not following from the normal causalities between input and output in neurons, so for now, 
it is assumed that the systemic level is a euphemism for free will. 
Every heartbeat, every tender whisper and angry frown, every action potential, every synaptic event, 
every thought and feeling, as well as the synthesis of neurotransmitters, the guidance of neurites and 
formation and pruning of synapses, is protein activity. For proteins, activity is structure. What a 
protein does, is a direct effect of the electric, hydrophobic and spatial interactions between the 
amino acids it is made of. And the information of the sequence of amino acids in all proteins is 
contained in the genes. An organism therefore can only do what its proteins do; its proteins can only 
do that, which their structure commands. And their structure can be nothing else than that, which is 
in the genes. 
Even if a trait were finalized in utero by maternal hormones acting to cause epigenetic modifications 
in the foetus, those modifications would be made by proteins, whose structure and hence function is 
determined by the genes of the foetus. There is therefore nothing non-genetic about epigenetics, and 
nothing non-genetic about any other environmental effects on function. But even though it is “all” 
in the genes, it’s important to understand, that genes themselves do not do anything. They are only 
an inert repository of information on how to build the molecules that do everything, i.e. the 
proteins. 
Finally, the third assumption is, that during evolution, nothing new can evolve that isn’t 
compatible with that which already exists. This really is a truism, but it is exceedingly important in 
the case of the most phylogenetically constrained organ of all, the brain. The only raw material 
natural selection has to work with, is random mutations. A mutation can only be tolerated and 
spread in the population, if its phenotype works flawlessly with all the existent functions it affects in 
the organism. As degrees of freedom are curtailed by stringent compatibility requirements, it 
follows, that evolutionary change in complex structures takes a long time – and there exists no more 
complex thing in the known universe than the brain of social mammals.  
11 
 
The human brain is therefore a primate brain with added networks for dexterity, conceptual thinking 
and language, and the primate brain is a mammal brain with adaptations for diurnal, arboreal and 
social living. One of the things we have in common with our mammalian relatives, is our emotional 
machinery. The increased area of the human neocortex has made it possible to activate different 
emotional programs in human-specific circumstances, and as conceptual thinkers, we can ascribe 
these emotions to near limitless reasons, but the emotions themselves are the same (e.g. Panksepp & 
Biven, 2012). What makes us unique among mammals are our cognitive and communicative 
capabilities and our manual dexterity, not our emotional inner life. 
In short, the assumptions of A-TRiC are 1. Emotions are brain activity, 2. Neurons are subject to 
the same laws of causality as all cells, and 3. Man is a social mammal whose brain, personality 
included, evolved to its species-specific modern form during the last 50-200 000 years in Sub-
Saharan East Africa – an environment very different both socially and technologically from the one 
we inhabit now. 
There is yet another, often overlooked issue to consider when theorizing about dimensional traits, 
like those that make up personality. If there exists genetic diversity in a trait, and any point on the 
continuum of its phenotype is consistently even slightly better in terms of reproductive success 
(fitness) of its bearer, the trait will be driven to fixation and phenotypic diversity will disappear. The 
trait will become a species-specific universal that will display almost no genetic variability in normal 
individuals. Any personality trait, therefore, must have been be adaptively neutral along its normal 
continuum in the environment where humans evolved, and the opposite poles must have had trade-
offs of equal magnitude; any benefit of being high or low on a trait, must come with a cost. This is a 
test that the traits of A-TRiC will have to pass in future studies if it is to be considered a valid model 
of the structure of human personality. 
There has been very little research on fitness and the FFM/B5, but results show a consistent 
correlation between reproductive success and traits Extraversion, Neuroticism and Openness 
(Alvergne, Jokela & Lummaa, 2010; Berg, Lummaa, Lahdenperä, Rotkirch & Jokela, 2014; Jokela, 
Alvergne, Pollet & Lummaa, 2011). This implies that those traits cannot be true personality traits. 
1.3.3 The traits of the A-TRiC 
As the above assumptions make clear, the very basis of any scientific theory of personality must 
build on what is evolvable in humans. Due to the phylogenetic constraints on the brain, we can 
safely assume that if universal mammalian personality traits exist, then because of common descent, 
we have them, too. During the expansion of the neocortex in humans, species-specific modifications 
and expansions of the stimulus space that activates each trait have certainly taken place, but the basic 
traits themselves must have been preserved. 
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It turns out all mammals (indeed, all vertebrates) studied so far exhibit intra-individually stable, inter-
individual differences in responses to novelty (Budaev, 1998). Social mammals also exhibit inter-
individual variability in how they react to conspecifics, and in how they react to social threat 
(Gosling, 2001). In a review of all studies on non-human primate personality, the clearest traits to 
emerge were indeed sociability, response to novelty and response to threat (Freeman & Gosling, 
2010).  
Given the underlying assumptions behind A-TRiC, these three universal mammalian traits must be 
part of human personality as well. In addition, the A-TRiC includes two traits, arrived at by the age-
old methods of scientific discovery: observation, study and armchair theorizing. Below, each 
hypothetical trait is given a brief presentation along with comments on how it compares to some 
related traits described by earlier researchers. 
In A-TRiC, the human equivalent of response to novelty is named (need for) Control. High need 
for Control manifests itself as timidity or wariness in new and strange situations and a dislike for 
sudden and unexpected changes in circumstances. At the opposite extreme are those, who are open 
to uncertainty and do not worry about the consequences of their actions. This does not mean that 
low Control is sufficient to make someone an impulsive excitement-seeker, but it is a necessary 
condition. Due to the different evolutionary roles for men and women in protecting offspring from 
harm on the one hand, and winning respect among peers by being ready for risky endeavours on the 
other, it is likely that women, on average, have higher levels of Control than men (e.g. Buss, 1989; 
Geary & Flinn, 2001). 
People with high levels of Control experience an undercurrent of emotional strain and anxiety in 
their daily lives, which makes them more susceptible to long-term stress and its consequences. 
Anxiety is a normal reaction to an aversive situation that is not strong enough to elicit outright fear 
and avoidance (e.g. McNaughton & Corr, 2004). It causes a subjectively uncomfortable state of 
“being torn in two” by opposing motives: to escape from the aversive situation or approach it and 
actively deal with it. This state allows the brain to gather information and make its appraisal on a 
complex, risky issue with pros and cons associated with all potential behavioural responses.  
Having a higher likelihood of finding unfamiliar or uncontrollable situations aversive, as by 
definition those with high levels of Control do, will make a person more susceptible to experiencing 
anxiety and developing stress. Therefore, Control should be associated with a propensity to suffer 
from clinically relevant anxiety/depression.  
Among existing psychometric tools, Burger and Cooper’s Desirability of Control Scale (1979) is for 
the most part a good measure of A-TRiC Control, but it contains some items that measure 
something akin to learned helplessness and assertiveness, which are not a part of A-TRiC Control. 
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Elements of A-TRiC Control can also be found in the TCI-R facets Anticipatory Worry (HA1) and 
Fear of Uncertainty (HA2) from trait Harm Avoidance, and Exploratory Excitability (NS1) from 
trait Novelty-Seeking (Cloninger, 1994). Several questionnaires for sensation-seeking also contain 
items that measure Control, although they mainly seem to focus on behaviour resulting from 
proneness to boredom or need for stimulation (e.g. Arnett, 1994; Zuckerman & Cloninger, 1996). 
In A-TRiC the emotion that crucially determines sociability in humans is Trust – here defined as a 
warm feeling of goodwill toward other people which includes the implicit assumption that this 
feeling is reciprocated. The opposite pole of Trust is, logically, suspicion and mistrust – a constant 
feeling that others are out to get you, unless you get them first. Someone with high Trust enjoys the 
company of others and is spontaneously generous and cooperative, without expecting something in 
return. Low Trust means you keep your cards close to your chest and refrain from helping others at 
your cost unless a profitable payback is certain. You also assume other people are unreliable and 
only looking out for number one. 
Facet A1 Trust from NEO-PI-R is mostly a good measure of A-TRiC Trust, as are some items from 
facet E1 Warmth. Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s General Trust Scale (1988) also measures A-TRiC 
Trust very closely. The Propensity to Trust Survey items are too focused on moral attitudes and self-
image to be of use (Evans & Revelle, 2008), while Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967) has been 
shown to measure at least four constructs, named Political Cynicism, Interpersonal Exploitation, 
Societal Hypocrisy, and Reliable Role-performance by Chun and Campbell (1974).  
Reactivity to threat is named, simply, Reactivity. The relevant stimuli to activate Reactivity are 
situations where there is a risk of losing resources and, especially, social standing. It is about “social 
territoriality” – protecting one’s perceived rights. More specifically, the threat is any perceived 
intentional act aimed at, or likely to infringe on, freedom, status or intended goals. As social standing 
is experienced as important, the proactive aspect of Reactivity is dominant aggression/assertiveness. 
High Reactivity makes a person explosive and on high alert all the time. It brings with it an 
undercurrent of baseline negative feelings and constant tension. Impatience and proneness to 
boredom are therefore integral parts of Reactivity and a highly reactive person is likely to look for 
any stimulation (sex, drugs, sport, excitement of any sort) to alleviate the tension. Highly reactive 
people are hypothesized to have constantly elevated stress-levels, which is one prerequisite of clinical 
depression, acting by way of low-grade, long-term systemic inflammation (Pasco et al., 2010; 
Rohleder, 2014). Someone low in Reactivity is calm, submissive and easy-going in the face of 
frustrations and it is hard to provoke him* into aggression. (Since people intuitively ascribe 
intentions to inanimate but “acting” objects like computers and photocopiers (Waytz, Gray, Epley & 
                                                          
* When singular third person pronouns are necessary, the masculine form will be used throughout. This decision was 
arrived at through a coin toss (coin: 2 euros; heads-female, tails-male). 
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Wegener, 2010), someone high in Reactivity would also be likely to rage against machines that fail to 
do his bidding.) 
As Reactivity includes a propensity for aggression and violence, traits akin to it have been 
extensively studied and operationalised due to their societal importance (e.g. Orpinas & Frankowski, 
2001). Reactivity is also measured by seven of eight items from the NEO-PI-R Neuroticism facet 
N2 Angry Hostility, as well as scattered items from several Agreeableness facets. The same applies 
to items from the MPQ Scales Aggression and Stress Reaction (Tellegen, Lykken, Bouchard Jr., 
Wilcox, Segal, & Rich, 1988) as well as the whole six-item CAT-PD-SF scale Anger (Grego, 
Oltmans & Widiger, 2018). 
Independence is a putative trait spanning a continuum from low to high need for social reward. 
Persons with high Independence don’t let their actions be affected by how much praise, respect, 
glory or acceptance, or lack thereof, is in it for them. Others see them as detached and aloof and 
maybe a bit odd. Psychiatry has even deemed being “apathetic to the admiration or disapproval of 
others” a symptom of a mental disorder (APA, 2013). Persons at the low extreme of the 
Independence spectrum act in ways determined by the expected reactions of other people, seeking 
their approval or respect, wanting to be liked and admired. This trait has, despite its name, nothing 
to do with the personality disorder category named Dependence. 
To my knowledge, Independence has not been operationalised so far. Intuitively, measures of 
reward dependence (Cloninger, 1994; Kose, 2003) or reward responsiveness (van den Berg, Franken, 
& Muris, 2010) would sound like good candidates, but they do not fit the bill. For example, the 
Reward Dependence scale of TCI-R purportedly measures the dimension [critical, aloof, detached, 
independent] to [sentimental, open, warm, sympathetic]. At the low end it seems to be an adequate measure 
of A-TRiC Independence (except for the critical), but the high end has nothing to do with 
Independence and a lot to do with A-TRiC Trust. One of the four facets (RD4 Dependence) comes 
close, but it, too, measures a combination of Trust and Independence (Kose, 2003). The TCI-R 
Reward Dependence also falls apart into several factors in exploratory factor analysis, so the 
construct isn’t unidimensional (Farmer & Goldberg, 2008). The Reward Responsiveness scale 
mainly measures willingness to partake in activities that give pleasure (van den Berg et al., 2010).  
The fifth trait, Analytical Thinking, is the most tentative one. To mark its as yet uncertain place, it 
is separated from Trust, Reactivity, Independence and Control by a hyphen in the abbreviation A-
TRiC. In psychology, the propensity to look for explanations within the realm of either the 
(analytical) mechanistic-reductionistic or the (intuitive) narrative-holistic, is seen as a cognitive style, 
not a personality trait. Most theories and their operationalisations focus on individual ability to 
override the intuitive, heuristic and bias-ridden thinking of the so-called System 1, with the slow, 
subjectively effortful thinking characteristic of System 2 (e.g. Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1974). This dichotomy between thinking styles has been recognized at least since the 
days of William James (1890, p. 451). 
Abilities are not relevant to personality as it is defined here, but since people seem to differ in a 
purely emotional willingness to adhere to mechanistic-reductionistic or narrative-holistic 
explanations, I feel Analytical Thinking fulfils the conditions of a personality trait. At the very least, 
the trait is an interesting one, since hypothetically it will determine to a large extent who among us 
are likely to seek answers in the spiritual-religious sphere and who will gravitate toward a scientific-
mechanistic worldview. It should also affect educational choices, so that high Analytical Thinking 
makes people more likely to pursue a career in natural science than other branches of academia. It is 
likely that men will score higher on this trait than women – a conjecture based on results attained by 
using scales that measure some aspects of A-TRiC Analytical Thinking (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 2010; 
Epstein, Pacini, Denes Raj, & Heier, 1996). 
High Analytical Thinking is characterized by a willingness to find mechanistic and reductionistic 
causal explanations to phenomena and a dissatisfaction with other types of explanations, specifically 
those, which include intentions of supernatural beings or forces. At the other extreme, people show 
a satisfaction with intuitive, holistic, narrative explanations. They may wish to embrace the mystical 
and even show a readiness to ascribe phenomena to intentional, supernatural beings, forces or 
energies. 
One model, where not just ability, but also willingness to engage in intuitive and rational thinking is 
considered, is the Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, operationalised by the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996). Some of the ten Experiential (Faith in Intuition) items from 
the REI engagement-subscale (as opposed to ability-subscale) could be used to measure A-TRiC 
Analytical Thinking, but the Rationality items, also called Need for Cognition items, measure mainly 
a wish to think a lot and solve difficult problems as well as a self-reported ability for logical and 
rational thinking. This is not a construct related to A-TRiC Analytical Thinking, which is a measure 
of emotional reactions to different types of explanations to phenomena. 
Stanovich sees reflection and openness to different viewpoints as central to individual variation in 
willingness to engage in System 2 thinking, so neither of the operationalisations he and his 
colleagues have developed, the Argument Evaluation Test (Stanovich & West, 1997) nor the 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale (Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999), measure A-TRiC Analytical 
Thinking. 
The same applies to the promisingly named Analytic-Holistic Scale (Choi, Koo & Choi, 2007), 
which contains no items measuring emotional reactions to mechanistic-reductionistic and narrative-
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holistic explanations to phenomena, but instead measures actual beliefs about how things are in the 
Universe and how disagreements between people should be handled, for example. 
 
1.4 Aims of the study 
Both theoretical and psychometric analyses indicate it is unlikely that the FFM/B5 maps the true 
independent traits of human personality. The aim above has been to explicate the requirements for 
such traits that could have evolved in humans and provide an outline for a model that fits those 
requirements. It has been all about delineating traits and their stimulus spaces in ways that fit the 
nomological network formed by what we know about evolution of dimensional traits in general and 
the evolution of the human brain in particular. 
The central aim of this study is to explore the psychometric properties of this first version of an 
operationalisation of the A-TRiC model ever to be presented to a group of subjects and see how it 
compares to results obtained from other samples using the NEO-PI-R. The following predictions 
will also be tested: 
1. Men will score higher than women on Analytical Thinking. 
2. Women will score higher than men on Control.  
3. Addicted individuals will score higher on Reactivity than non-addicted individuals.  
4. Those with a diagnosis for depression and/or anxiety disorder, will have higher scores on Control 
and Reactivity.  
5. Those with an education in natural sciences will have higher scores on Analytical Thinking than 
those with vocational education or humanistic/social/behavioural science educations.   
 
2. Methods  
2.1 Participants  
Participants (N = 1027; men 37.9%, women 61.0%, other 1.1%; Mage 40.9 years, age range: 15-78 
years) were passively recruited from the social media site Facebook by placing ads with 
Administrator approval in several groups of everyday nature, like home improvement, (non-
psychoactive) mushroom and berry picking, a discussion group for lay people on scientific issues, a 
group for everyday financial advice etc. The ad contained a short description of the research in 
Finnish and a link that lead to the questionnaire, also in Finnish. To provide transparency, anyone 
could contact me at any time through my personal Facebook profile or by email for additional 
information. All participants had the possibility to acquire their own test results with comments. 
17 
 
Participants who gave an invented password at the end of the questionnaire and sent me the 
password from an anonymous email account, got their results mailed to this account. 
42.0% of participants had a university degree and 42.8% had a vocational degree (including higher 
vocational education), while 5.6% had attained only primary education and 9.5% only secondary 
education. 16.7% were students, 53.4% workers and 12.5% executives, while 17.3% identified 
themselves as freelancers/entrepreneurs. Those who were unemployed were asked to choose their 
last position before unemployment. 
Markku Verkasalo kindly provided me with raw data on 306 subjects, mainly university students 
from Finland, Germany and Great Britain (men 33.3%, women 66.7%; Mage 23.9 years, age range: 
18-52 years) who had filled the NEO-PI-R questionnaire. Unless stated otherwise, all results referred 
to as NEO data are analysed from this data.  
 
2.2 The questionnaire 
The online questionnaire (Appendix 2) consisted of 36 preliminary items assessing A-TRiC traits, 
and items assessing potentially interesting correlates to the hypothesised traits, like self-reported 
addiction, and medical diagnoses of depression and/or anxiety disorder. In addition to the 
preliminary A-TRiC items, some alternative items were included, to be exchanged with the original 
items, if they were to provide a better fit with the model. The number of items was intentionally 
larger than the ideal number for the final questionnaire, to allow for pruning of less successful items. 
All scoring was on a five-point Likert scale, range 0-4. In total, the questionnaire consisted of 86 
items in addition to background questions concerning things like education and profession. Figure 1 
shows the final items used for measuring A-TRiC, translated from the original Finnish for 
demonstrational purposes only.  
Addiction was assessed by the item I am addicted to alcohol or some other substance that produces an 
immediate feeling of well-being. The answers were dichotomized by treating the three highest values as 
admitting to addiction and the two lowest as not admitting to addiction.  
The item assessing whether the participant had received a diagnosis of depression or anxiety I have 
received a diagnosis for anxiety and/or depression had the instruction to choose alternative Never if they 
had never had a diagnosis, Seldom if they had received a diagnosis for anxiety, Sometimes if they had 
received a diagnosis for depression and Always if they had received a diagnosis for both. A 
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Figure 1. Items included in the final A-TRiC. Notes. A=Analytical Thinking,  T=Trust, R=Reactivity, i=Independence, C=Control. 
 
dichotomized variable was formed by combining into one category any answers admitting to 
receiving a diagnosis, and into the second category those denying ever being diagnosed. The 
rationale behind combining anxiety and depression into one category is that the comorbidity of the 
two is so high it is questionable, whether they truly form different ontological categories outside the 
clinical setting (Caspi et al., 2014; Olfson et al., 1997). 
 
3 Results 
All analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics software version 25.0 and IBM AMOS 
version 25.0. Although Likert scales are ordinal, the item and compound variables computed from 
the items were treated as continuous variables. This is formally wrong, but also common practice. 
To give this practice some credence, Rossellini and Brown (2011) used both continuous and 
categorical modelling when analysing their data on the NEO-FFI. They report, that the results were 
“virtually identical” for factor loadings and other parameters. As Cronbach’s alpha is the indicator 
for internal consistency that is used in peer-reviewed literature for both domain and facet levels of 
NEO-PI-R data, and it is computed using Pearson’s correlations, Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
will be used for the sake of comparability, instead of the more appropriate Spearman’s rank 
correlation. 
There was an average .33% of values missing per A-TRiC item. Since AMOS doesn’t allow for any 
missing values, an imputation was needed. Little’s MCAR test result for the complete dataset was 
χ2(1080, N = 1027) = 1091.55, p = .397, while p-values for each trait separately ranged from .366 to 
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.804. This indicated that values were missing completely at random, and an imputation of missing 
values could be performed. To this end, the expectation-maximization algorithm was used.  
Figure 2 shows distributions of scores for the A-TRiC trait variables. The distribution for Analytical 
Thinking is more left-skewed than the other distributions (Table 1), but both skewness and kurtosis 
were well within what is generally deemed acceptable and the distributions can be considered 
approximately symmetric (Bulmer, 1979). All trait variables had moderately leptokurtic distributions. 
 
 
 
Correlations between traits were below |.2| (Table 1), except between Reactivity and Independence 
(-.267) and between Trust and Control (-.249). The highest inter-domain correlations in the NEO 
data (results not shown) were between Neuroticism and Conscientiousness (-.420), between 
Extraversion and Openness (.332), between Agreeableness and Openness (.290) and between 
Neuroticism and Extraversion (-.224). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Histograms of A-TRiC trait scores. Notes. A=Analytical Thinking, T=Trust, R=Reactivity, i=Independence, C=Control 
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Table 1 
Trait variable properties, inter-trait Pearson correlations, average inter-item Pearson correlations and Cronbach’s α 
  A T R i C 
N Valid 1027 1027 1027 1027 1027 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 2.53 1.88 2.21 1.91 2.17 
Standard deviation .817 .608 .650 .699 .687 
Skewness -.489 -.167 -.064 -.013 -.090 
Standard error of skewness .076 .076 .076 .076 .076 
Kurtosis -.303 -.339 -.120 -.183 -.356 
Standard error of kurtosis .152 .152 .152 .152 .152 
      
Analytical Thinking 1 -.102 -.022 .052 -.010 
Trust  1 -.196 -.063 -.249 
Reactivity   1 -.267 .199 
Independence    1 -.041 
      
Average inter-item correlations .544 .381 .502 .486 .423 
Cronbach’s α .769 .623 .759 .726 .684 
Note. A=Analytical Thinking, T=Trust, R=Reactivity, i=Independence, C=(Need for) Control. 
 
 
Cronbach’s alphas for A-TRiC as well as average inter-item correlations are listed in Table 1. Inter-
item correlations are given because they allow for comparisons between variables consisting of 
different numbers of items, whereas the value of Cronbach’s alpha depends on the number of items 
as well as their correlations, making it less fit as a measure of actual internal consistency (Clark & 
Watson, 1995).  
Average inter-item correlations for A-TRiC ranged from .381 for Trust to .544 for Analytical 
thinking (Table 1). Average inter-facet correlations for the NEO data ranged from .309 for 
Openness to .476 for Neuroticism and average inter-item correlations for the facets ranged from 
.144 for O6 Values to .416 for N3 Depression. Seven facets had average inter-item correlations 
below .200 and there were negative correlations between items in nine facets.  
Average inter-item correlations for the domains measured by NEO-FFI-R items were: Neuroticism 
.333, Extraversion .242, Openness .215, Agreeableness .197 and Conscientiousness .306. Within the 
domains there were a total of 36 correlations below .100. 
No increase in alpha could have been achieved by removal of any item of the final A-TRiC. In the 
NEO data, removal of facets N5 (Impulsiveness), E5 (Excitement-seeking), O4 (Actions), A5 
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(Modesty) and C6 (Deliberation) would have each led to higher internal consistencies for their 
respective domains for NEO-PI-R. 
 
3.1. Factor structure 
The factor structure of the A-TRiC was investigated by performing exploratory factor analysis with 
fixed number of factors alongside confirmatory factor analysis (Cignac, 2009). Since there was 
adequate multinormality, maximum likelihood estimation was chosen as it allows for the 
computation of a wide range of indices of the goodness of fit (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum & 
Strahan, 1999). The sums of squares of the loadings for the Varimax-rotated solution are in Table 2. 
The five-factor solution is responsible for the common variance constituting 36.7% of the total 
variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results of the exploratory factor analysis of A-TRiC items with factor number set to five, are shown 
in Table 3 for orthogonal model (Varimax rotation) and in Table 4 for oblique model (Oblimin 
rotation). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .794.  
The path diagrams for the A-TRiC and NEO-PI-R orthogonal and oblique models are in Figures 2 
and 3, respectively.  
 
Table 2 
Rotation sums of squared loadings for A-TRiC items 
Factor    Rotated total % of variance Cumulative % 
1    2.337 8.657 8.657 
2    2.134 7.903 16.560 
3    1.952 7.229 23.789 
4    1.927 7.138 30.927 
5    1.567 5.805 36.731 
Note. Rotated total = sums of squared loadings for Varimax-rotated solution. 
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Figure 2. Path diagrams of A-TRiC orthogonal (left) and oblique models. 
Figure 3. Path diagrams of NEO-PI-R orthogonal (left) and oblique models. 
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Table 5 displays model fit indices for the A-TRiC and NEO-PI-R for both orthogonal models and 
oblique models, with secondary loadings set to zero for both. As conventional model fit indices 
(except the TLI) are substantially affected by sample size (Marsh, Balla & McDonald, 1988), indices 
for the whole A-TRiC data (A-TRiC n1027) are shown alongside indices for the American 
normative sample for NEO-PI-R (NEO-PI-R n1000) (Aluja et al., 2005; Parker, Bagby & 
Summerfeldt, 1993), and the average values of three random samples of N = 306 from the A-TRiC 
dataset (A-TRiC n306), are shown with the NEO data (NEO-PI-R n306).  
RMSEA values indicated a relatively good fit for the A-TRiC data but not for the NEO-PI-R 
datasets according to the conventional cut-off value of .05 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). For A-TRiC, the 
χ2/df was close to 5, which is indicative of acceptable fit (Kline, 2015). None of the other fit indices 
indicated a good fit. Due to the hierarchical structure of NEO-PI-R, any item-level discrepancies 
remain invisible, as the facet scores take their place in the calculation of indices. Using such 
aggregate scores systematically inflates apparent model fit (Marsh, 2007). 
 
 
3.2 Predicted group differences 
There were gender differences in Analytical Thinking F(1,1014) = 106.1, p < .001 and Control 
F(1,1014) = 70.9, p < .001 in the directions predicted, with males scoring higher on Analytical 
Thinking (Mmale = 2.93, Mfemale = 2.36) and lower on Control than females (Mmale = 1.99, Mfemale = 
Table 5 
Model fit indices for A-TRiC and NEO-PI-R in three samples, for models with no secondary loadings. 
  χ2 df χ2/df RMR GFI AGFI NFI CFI RMSEA 
Orth. A-TRiC n1027 1658.25 324 5.12 .091 .884 .865 .744 .783 .063 
 NEO-PI-R n1000 5674.39 405 14.01 .175* .689 .642 .564 .581 .114 
 A-TRiC n306 795.91 324 2.46 .102 .835 .807 .639 .746 .069 
 NEO-PI-R n306 2263.96 405 5.59 .064 .644 .592 .506 .551 .123 
           
Obl. A-TRiC n1027 1417.24 314 4.51 .066 .899 .878 .782 .820 .059 
 NEO-PI-R n1000 4866.07 395 12.32 .122* .717 .666 .626 .645 .106 
 A-TRiC n306 725.02 314 2.31 .081 .848 .817 .671 .778 .066 
 NEO-PI-R n306 2056.37 395 5.21 .052 .659 .598 .551 .599 .117 
Note. Orth.=Orthogonal model, Obl.=Oblique model, A-TRiC n1027=complete sample, A-TRiC n306=average of three random samples of 306 
cases from complete data, NEO-PI-R n1000=normative sample, USA, NEO-PI-R n306=the NEO data, df=degrees of freedom, RMR=Root 
Mean Square Residual, GFI=Goodness of Fit Index, AGFI=Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index, NFI=Normed Fit Index, CFI=Comparative Fit 
Index, RMSEA=Root Mean Square Error of Approximation. *Values from Parker, Bagby & Summerfeldt (1993) due to error in Aluja et al. (2005), 
giving nonsensical results for RMR. 
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2.38). Cohen’s d for the gender difference in Analytical Thinking was .682, and for Control it was 
.543, so the effect size was moderate for both. 
252 participants reported being addicted to alcohol or some other substance causing strong, 
immediate sense of well-being. As predicted, they scored higher on Reactivity than those not 
admitting to being addicted F(1,1021) = 25.8, p < .001. Cohen’s d = .336, so the effect size was very 
small. 
481 participants reported having received a medical diagnosis of either depression or anxiety, or 
both. Compared to participants without diagnoses, there was a significant difference in their level of 
Reactivity F(1,1023) = 18.7, p < .001; Cohen’s d = .254 and Control F(1,1023) = 37.8, p < .001; 
Cohen’s d = .404 in the directions predicted, with higher scores on both traits for those with a 
diagnosis. 
There was a difference in Analytical Thinking between groups with different types of education 
F(3,1023) = 23.3, p < .001. The level of Analytical Thinking was significantly higher, as expected, in 
those with an education in natural sciences, compared to those with an education in 
humanities/social/behavioural sciences (Bonferroni corrected p < .001; Cohen’s d = .721) and those 
with a vocational education (Bonferroni corrected p < .001; Cohen’s d = .544).  
 
4 Discussion 
The results give reason for cautionary optimism as to the plausibility of the proposed trait structure, 
despite mistakes made in this first attempt at operationalisation. These are discussed below. With the 
benefit of hindsight, all but one of the mistakes make sense within the original A-TRiC definitions. 
Naturally, internal consistency has to be validated in an independent sample, as some items with low 
correlations were dropped from the final version of the questionnaire, thereby raising average inter-
item correlations for the A-TRiC traits in this sample.  
 
4.1 Unexpected group differences 
In addition to the predicted and reported gender differences, there were statistically significant but 
smaller differences in Independence and Reactivity, too, with men being more independent (p = 
.009, Cohen’s d = .168) and women being more reactive (p < .001, Cohen’s d = .286). The higher 
Reactivity is in line with results for the Neuroticism facet Angry Hostility, where seven of the eight 
items measure A-TRiC Reactivity. Women were higher on Angry Hostility in the NEO data (p = 
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.022, Cohen’s d = .283) as well as in earlier studies (Costa, Terracciano & McCrae, 2001). There was 
no difference in Trust between men and women (p = .172). 
In addition to the predicted differences in diagnosed depression and/or anxiety, higher Trust seems 
to offer slight protection from such mental problems (p < .001, Cohen’s d = .340). A logical result, 
with the benefit of hindsight. 
In addition to the predicted differences in Analytical Thinking, those with no education after 
primary and middle school also scored lower than those with an education in natural science 
(Bonferroni-corrected p = .011 Cohen’s d = .425). It is interesting to note, that the difference was 
smaller than the differences between natural science vs. vocational education and natural science vs. 
humanities/behavioural/social science. 
 
4.2 Lessons learned about the traits 
The skewness of the distribution of scores on Analytical Thinking could be due to advertisement 
for the study on the Facebook site Skepsis, dedicated to sceptical discussion about science and 
pseudoscience, whereas no advertisements were placed on any sites embracing religion or mysticism. 
The items proved successful at keeping the measure clean from cross-contamination by other traits. 
This was far easier to achieve than with the other traits, as Analytical Thinking is clearly different in 
its stimulus space and the emotions it activates; it is about mechanistic curiosity, the objects of 
which are usually phenomena outside the social sphere. Mechanistic curiosity can also be found in 
individually varying amounts in other great apes (Uher, Asendorpf & Call, 2008), but naturally it 
comes to its own in us, who have evolved quite another level of conceptual cognitive abilities and 
fine motor skills.  
There is no counterpart for Analytical Thinking in the FFM/B5, with the partial exception of B5 
Intellect which, on the one hand, misses the emotional quality by concentrating on abilities like size 
of vocabulary, and on the other hand, misses the breadth of Analytical thinking by only focusing on 
the verbal and conceptual domains. NEO-PI-R contains no items measuring analytical thinking. So, 
it seems fair to say, that no attention is paid to this trait in contemporary mainstream personality 
research. This might be considered an oversight, given the importance of analytical thinking in 
education as well as the industrial-organizational sphere, where FFM/B5 tests are much used. 
Some Trust items proved tainted by Reactivity. The quintessence of high Trust is a simple feeling of 
good will towards people, an experience of joy, warmth and relaxation in their midst, whereas low 
Trust turns out not to be suspicion and malevolence as hypothesized, but simply social wariness. For 
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true paranoid-type suspicion and a readiness to manipulate and take advantage of others, low Trust 
needs high Reactivity by its side.  
This was the only case, where the empirical results gave reason to redefine one pole of the trait 
dimension somewhat. A more appropriate name for the trait would therefore be Affinity, but to 
avoid confusion, Trust will be used here. 
An example of mistakes in operationalisation is the item If I have information that is worth money, I 
keep it to myself. In addition to being tainted by Reactivity in measuring the subjective importance of 
securing resources, it forced subjects to imagine situations where many of them have not been, so it 
ended up having low correlations with purer Trust items. As it only had two cross-correlations 
above .10 (logically with Reactivity items), it did map mainly onto Trust and was left in the final test, 
pending removal in future versions. 
The core of Reactivity seems clear. It is a continuum ranging from zen-like calmness and flexible 
submission to a need for dominance and an almost constant vigilance: a smouldering, short fuse and 
a readiness to attack at the slightest hint of affront or frustration. Mapping the stimulus space is 
more challenging, but it seems safe to assume activation will be strongest to threats against social 
standing (one’s perceived “rights”) and against goal-directed behaviour.  
The constant negative vigilance of the highly reactive person can only be alleviated by competing 
stimulation, be it external activity or the manipulation of neural chemistry with drugs, so it was 
assumed that Reactivity includes impatience, impulsiveness and proneness to boredom. According 
to the data, this seems to be the case. This association is corroborated by earlier research (Dahlen, 
Martin, Ragan & Kuhlman, 2004; Rupp & Vodanovich, 1997). 
From the very beginning, Independence proved difficult to “purify”. How can one formulate items 
that measure (reversed) need for social approval, but which are not tainted by the effects of Trust 
(wanting to be liked) or Reactivity (wanting to be respected and obeyed)? It seems I succeeded in the 
former, but not in the latter, as Independence and Reactivity did correlate moderately (r = -.267). 
Also, the item I like being at the centre of attention (reversed) measured Independence well, but cross-
correlated with Control item I enjoy peace and quiet (r = .235), for obvious reasons. 
The difficulty in keeping apart Control and Reactivity stems from the underlying ambience of 
wariness and vigilance that they share, which gives those with high levels of either trait an 
undercurrent of near-constant tension and negative experience. This is reflected in that the 
discarded, rather unspecific item It feels like my body is constantly tense correlated with both Reactivity (r 
= .254) and Control (r = .393). 
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In hindsight, the correlations between Reactivity and item C4 Background noises disturb my concentration 
(r = .267) and C5 I get easily anxious, when I think about all that can happen in the future (r = .245) seem 
logical, too, given the tense vigilance typical for both traits. The Reactivity item I get frustrated if I’m in 
a hurry and someone is slowing me down measured Reactivity well, but correlated with Control also, as it 
maps onto anger because of the obstacle between a person and his goal (Reactivity) as well as 
anguish about losing control over a situation by being late (Control). 
 
4.3 Trait synergy – personality is more than the sum of traits 
As the ruminations above show, careful thought is required to distil the truly independent essence of 
each trait. Due to the intricate ways in which the four social traits (“the TRiC”) interact within each 
person, they will never be on display in their pure form. It is this focus on interaction and inter-trait 
modulation that is the true strength of A-TRiC. Below are a few examples of how the high and low 
extremes of the four traits theoretically modulate each other, beginning with a description of 
interactions that would produce some of the personality extremes given diagnostic status. For 
brevity, plus and minus signs are used to denote high and low extremes, respectively, and first letters 
of trait names. 
The combination -T+R comprises the minimum requirement for antisocial personality disorder (pd) 
or, depending on the clinician, paranoid pd. +R is enough for aggression, but -T is needed for the 
callousness that is part of the diagnostic criteria. -C adds impulsive externalizing into the mix, while -
i in this context adds a strong desire for power over people, which is needed for narcissistic pd. 
Given enough cognitive skills, higher levels of C would make such a person methodical and 
restrained enough to be an asset for jobs where ruthlessness and (non-physical) aggression are 
appreciated. Such successful psychopathy is described by psychologists Babiak and Hare in their 
popular book Snakes in Suits – When Psychopaths go to Work (2006). 
-T+i is the template for a social recluse, who is content by himself and doesn’t care what others 
think of his choices. Such a combination could at its extreme lead to a schizoid pd diagnosis. 
Extreme -C can easily cause problems, as in combination with +R (borderline pd) or by otherwise 
exacerbating the effects of almost any personality disorder, but there is one diagnosis lurking at the 
extreme end of +C, too, namely obsessive-compulsive pd, especially in combination with -T. The 
only personality disorder characterized by extreme +T (with -i) is dependent pd, while histrionic pd 
                                                          
 My assumption here is to trust the slowly maturing consensus that the theory (such as it is) behind personality disorders is mistaken 
and that the ten categories given personality disorder labels have no ontological status outside the diagnostic manuals and offices of 
clinicians adhering to them. Instead, the view that personality traits are continua with normal distributions implies, that the outer 
extremes will be rare and often maladaptive. It also implies, that any complex mental manifestations deemed pathological, i.e., not 
simple disruptions of function, must be extremes of traits that we all have. For a review of the state of psychiatric diagnostics, see e.g. 
Haslam, Holland & Kuppens, 2012.  
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is an example of extreme -i (with -T). In fact, histrionic pd and schizoid pd form opposite ends of 
the Independence dimension, when keeping T constant. 
Of course, many interesting outcomes outside psychopathology result from trait interactions. One 
example is risk-taking, which is modulated by C and R. A maximally risk-averse person will be +C-
R, whereas +R will make risk-taking more likely, both due to proneness to boredom/need for 
stimulation and due to the easily flaring anger, which has been shown to be associated with greater 
risk-taking (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). According to A-TRiC therefore, impulsivity is not a 
unidimensional construct, but draws from two sources: R and C. In general, impulsivity is a rather 
fuzzy concept, measured in different ways, sometimes including both fast and “thoughtless” 
reactions to environmental stimuli and a propensity to act quickly on an internally generated idea (for 
an exhaustive review on impulsivity and constraint, see Carver, 2005), but its smallest common 
denominator is a readiness to do new things (-C) and a need for instant gratification (+R). The 
enabling effect of -C on both sensation-seeking and externalizing aggression provides a solution to 
the so-called “aggression paradox” (Joireman, Anderson, & Strathman, 2003), as it explains why 
externalizing aggression and impulsive sensation-seeking consistently correlate, despite being 
modelled as independent traits (García-Forero, Gallardo-Pujol, Maydeu-Olivares, & Andrés-Pueyo, 
2009; Gomà-i-Freixanet, Valero, Puntí, & Zuckerman (2004); Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta 
& Kraft, 1993). 
Although +C and +R are each associated with a negative subjective experience, being +C might 
paradoxically make life somewhat easier to someone who is +R, as the need for control makes it less 
likely that the high reactivity leads to dire consequences due to impulsive risk-taking or externalized 
aggression or drug-taking. At the other extreme, being born +T-R+i-C is a true jackpot for mental 
well-being. This lucky person is a calm, adaptable, easy-going, resilient and trusting optimist who 
enjoys people, but is not dependent on their admiration or approval for his happiness. Less 
subjective well-being but more fun to be around is he who is +T-R-i-C: always ready for excitement 
and willing to do anything to make an impression on friends and acquaintances. Changing the 
polarity of R makes him assertive and a bit bossy, though.  
It has long been recognized, that people react differently to reward and punishment. For some, (the 
expectation of) reward is a stronger motivator, while others respond more acutely to (a fear of) 
punishment (Carver & White, 1994). This is a logical result from different placement along the C 
continuum. Whereas low Independence is needed to be sensitive to both social reward and 
punishment, +C will make a person selectively more sensitive to punishment and -C makes him 
selectively more sensitive to reward. The most commonly used three-factor scale for reward 
sensitivity include items that, from an A-TRiC point of view, measure aspects of -i (Reward 
Responsiveness) -C (Fun Seeking) and a mixture of -i+R (Drive) (Carver & White, 1994). The 
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original reward sensitivity proposed by Gray (e.g. 1987) comes closer to describing effects of only C 
and i. 
 
4.4 Anomalies of the FFM/B5 interpreted through the A-TRiC 
As argued above (section 1.2), instead of mapping true traits of personality, it is conceivable that the 
FFM/B5 reveals consistent ways in which people evaluate others, and that Neuroticism is a factor 
resulting mainly from subjective preferences of the clinically oriented psychologists involved in the 
conception of the model. Also, the trait Openness/Intellect has been surrounded by controversy 
from its inception, when it was called Culture and loaded on concepts like socially polished, boorish, 
clumsy and aesthetically fastidious (Tupes & Christal, 1961). A whole Special Issue of The European 
Journal of Personality has been devoted to problems surrounding Openness/Intellect and given that 
even the Grand Old Man of the B5 calls the state of the trait an embarrassment (Goldberg, 1994), it 
will not be commented on any further here. Instead, the systematic psychometric anomalies of the 
remaining three traits will be examined within the framework of the A-TRiC.  
4.4.1 Extraversion and Agreeableness 
In the FFM/B5, affiliation (A-TRiC Trust), need for social reward (A-TRiC Independence) and 
assertiveness (A-TRiC Reactivity) are all parts of one domain, Extraversion. That they are indeed 
separate traits, gets corroboration in results from 39 nations (Lucas, Diener, Suh, Shao & Grob, 
2000), and even earlier, Church (1994) showed that facets of Extraversion separate into three 
factors. One of them measures aspects of A-TRiC Trust (E1 Warmth and E6 Positive Emotions), 
another mainly Reactivity (E3 Assertiveness and E4 Activity) and the third a mix of Independence 
and Control (E2 Gregariousness and E5 Excitement-seeking). Elsewhere (Traupman et al., 2009), 
Extraversion and Agreeableness facets have been shown to coalesce over domain borders and form 
two factors that correspond to the two orthogonal axes of the Inter-Personal Circumplex: Control 
(dominance-submissiveness; roughly equivalent to Reactivity) and Affiliation (warmth-hostility; 
roughly equivalent to Trust).  
In an exploratory factor analysis (Maximum Likelihood, Oblimin rotation) performed on the 
Extraversion items (NEO data, results not shown), nine factors of at least three items and loadings 
>.3 formed. The themes of the seven factors with reasonable interpretations were: 1. being cheerful, 
liking people, 2. disliking solitude or working alone, 3. being assertive, 4. being gregarious, 5. feeling 
joyful, laughing easily, 6. being in a hurry, being energetic and 7. enjoying talking to people, needing 
people around. With the conditions mentioned, no factor measuring warmth/affiliation formed. As 
assertiveness is dependent on high Reactivity and a baseline feeling of joyfulness and cheerfulness 
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depend on low Reactivity, A-TRiC predicts that factor 3 would correlate negatively with factors 1 
and 5. Indeed, correlations were negative between the assertiveness factor and factor 1 (-.186) and 
factor 5 (-.104).  
In an exploratory factor analysis (Maximum Likelihood, Oblimin rotation) of domain Agreeableness 
in the NEO data, facet A1 Trust remained intact and was unrelated to a factor formed around 
externalizing anger (r = .14), whereas there was a slightly higher correlation (r = .39) between A1 
Trust and a factor formed around Machiavellian traits (results not shown). This pattern is expected, 
if Machiavellian malevolence and manipulation depend on both Trust and Reactivity, whereas 
externalizing anger depends on Reactivity only. 
4.4.2 Conscientiousness 
Some indirect evidence for the existence of a trait like Control comes from studies on the FFM/B5. 
Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark and Goldberg (2005) as well as Jackson, Paunonen, Fraboni and 
Goffin (1996) have shown, that Conscientiousness splits into two factors, one measuring ambition 
(mainly A-TRiC Independence), the other measuring a need for control over one’s environment (the 
essence of A-TRiC Control). 
In an exploratory factor analysis (Maximum Likelihood, Oblimin rotation) performed on the 
Conscientiousness items, seven factors of at least three items with loadings >.3 formed (NEO data, 
results not shown). Their themes were: 1. being goal-oriented, efficient, 2. thinking before acting, 3. 
getting things done, 4. keeping thing in order, 5. being dependable, 6. being fastidious, prudent and 
7. striving for achievement. All factors have an undercurrent of (low) Independence, a will to 
impress others. In addition, factors 2, 4 and 6 measure aspects of A-TRiC Control, while factor 7 
measures mainly Reactivity (in the context of low Independence). The average correlation between 
the “Reactivity” factor and the “Control” factors was .083, while the “Control” factors had an 
average correlation of .281 amongst each other. 
 
4.5 On the design of the A-TRiC questionnaire 
A quick look at the literature shows that there exists no true consensus on, let alone knowledge 
about, what constitutes the best form, length, or type of content of personality tests (e.g. Bollen & 
Lennox, 1991; Burisch, 1984; Burisch, 1997; Clark & Watson, 1995). This is not surprising, if we 
assume we have not been measuring true traits of personality; no matter how non-coherent entities 
are measured, the results will always seem a bit off. 
When measuring personality, we are trying to home in on subtle individual differences in 
neuroanatomy and synaptic dynamics. These differences are the necessary and sufficient substance 
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of personality (see section 1.3.2). Since they are unavailable to direct study with current technology, 
including imaging methods with their low functional resolution, we must make do with asking 
people for introspections on their emotional reactions, as these are the subjective results of the 
underlying neurophysiological and -anatomical differences – the last point upstream from where 
situational effects radically increase variability in behavioural reactions. 
Specifically, the A-TRiC questionnaire attempts to measure the main traits in as pure a form as 
possible. The resulting profile then reveals the individual personality that arises from the multitude 
of interactions between the traits. Only a complete profile with an individual’s placement on all 
traits, allows for prediction of real-life outcomes.  
By focusing on emotions instead of overt behaviour when designing questionnaire items, two things 
can be achieved. First, one is dealing with a more unadulterated aspect of personality, and second, 
items about emotions may make it easier to answer honestly, as social desirability and cultural 
expectations focus on behaviour rather than feelings. As personality traits have evolved in very 
different circumstances than the ones we live in now, the best items will also be as “stone-age 
compatible” as possible. It is preferable to ask for reactions to generalizable situations and not 
describe specifically modern settings in the items. This has the added advantage of making the test 
maximally culture neutral. 
The A-TRiC questionnaire contains no lie-scale and no items checking for absurd answering or 
inconsistencies due to a lapse of concentration or random answering. This is a decision made on 
partly subjective, partly theoretical grounds. I choose to believe, that a subject will answer truthfully, 
and due to the brevity of the questionnaire, will not space out either. My good faith in test takers 
stems less from my belief in human nature than from the way the A-TRiC questionnaire is designed. 
It differs from FFM/B5 tests in that there are very few morally laden items, and as only the 
complete profile reveals the personality that emerges from the interactions between the traits, the 
test remains rather opaque, despite its surface simplicity. I also believe negative wordings only 
confuse and make answering too “cognitive”, as the subject will have to mentally rotate the scale 
180 degrees before answering. Therefore, I chose not to strive for a strict balance between negative 
and positive wording, instead aiming at unambiguity and simple expression. 
Poor consistency is typical for all personality tests and it is intuitively tempting to believe Epstein 
(1983) when he claims that personality traits are so broad, that they can only be measured with a 
large number of items that do not correlate too strongly with each other. Some researchers even give 
specific guidelines for appropriate correlations:  
"The .2 to .4 range of intercorrelations would seem to offer an acceptable balance between bandwidth on the 
one hand and fidelity on the other." (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, p. 114) 
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This statement, however, only applies if using a formative indicator measurement model, where the 
construct is the sum of its indicators. Then using a broad spectrum of items is what gives breadth to 
the latent construct and removing an item will narrow it down. But with such a model there is no 
reason to assume that the latent construct has any independent existence in the world. A truly 
independent and correctly defined unidimensional personality trait cannot be complex in a way that 
would preclude measuring it with only a few items (Bollen & Lennox, 1991).  
The FFM/B5 and the A-TRiC both assume that personality traits are independent and 
unidimensional biological entities, which are measured by reflective indicators, i.e. the test items. 
From this follows, that any items comprising the facets and any facets comprising the domains, 
should be interchangeable. Advocates of the FFM/B5 defend the use of up to hundreds of items by 
stating that the “constructs measured are extremely broad” (McCrae & Costa, 1997, p. 588). This is 
not an acceptable defence, if they also maintain that their tests are measuring unidimensional 
independent entities.  
A fear of (randomly) “imperfect” answering seems to me the only valid reason to use many items. 
The argument is, that items may arouse somewhat different representations in the mind of the test 
taker, but hopefully, with different formulations centring around the core of the construct itself, they 
will tend to average out on the correctish level for that person.  
 
4.6 Why is the A-TRiC not hierarchical? 
The concept of hierarchies in personality derives from the graphics of structural equation modelling 
(SEM), where correlations among latent constructs can be “resolved” by adding a second level of 
latent constructs representing those correlations. The FFM/B5 has taken advantage of this 
methodological possibility by adding a lower level of latent constructs into the model: the facets. 
This allows test designers to include large numbers of items relevant to real-world outcomes, which 
would not form the assumed five factors in exploratory factor analyses. Such hierarchies are a purely 
methodological construct, but it is often erroneously assumed they reflect information processing in 
the brain. This assumption leads to much faulty reasoning in psychology, so the issue deserves a few 
words. 
Let’s assume there exists a specific neural network for each FFM/B5 domain, that is activated by 
stimuli that are specific to it only. The intensity of network activity is modulated by stimulus 
strength, but all relevant stimuli cause qualitatively similar activity. This domain network’s output is 
channelled to six facet networks, which all get activated to the same extent each time the domain 
network is activated, since there can’t be any facet-specific filtering for stimuli at the level of the 
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domain. In such a case, the facet networks must get input from other neural systems downstream of 
sensory receptors but independent of domain network activity, and overriding the input from the 
domain network, so that only the appropriate facet activates the appropriate emotional state and 
behaviour, because all six facet networks can’t be activated at once. If this is the case, then the facets 
are only situation-specific reactions to domain activation and the domain is the true trait.  
If, on the other hand, a domain network itself responds differently to different relevant stimuli thereby 
activating only the appropriate facet network, it is functionally part of the facet, and independent of 
other facets. In this scenario, the facet is the trait and no domain exists.  
As far as I can fathom, there can exist no possible organisation of brain networks that would be 
compatible with the psychometrically manifested hierarchy, so the law of parsimony dictates that 
hierarchies are an artefact of cross-correlations that are a result of poorly defined traits. These 
reflections should make it clear why A-TRiC has no hierarchical structure. Also, any substantial 
cross-correlations are signs of either faulty definition of the traits or badly formulated items. 
Even though there can exist no hierarchies of latent constructs in the brain, there is one area, where 
the psychometric hierarchies of SEM may make sense: performance on IQ tests. Different areas of 
the brain solve different types of cognitive tests, but if solving all tests depends on the concurrent 
activity of one single “domain-general” functional network, like working memory for example, then 
a g-factor will emerge above the test-specific differences in performance. But this is due to a big 
conceptual difference between cognitive capacity and personality as phenomena. In IQ test 
performance, there is more or less of a thing; in personality we deal with thresholds to activation of 
several different emotion networks within trait-specific settings. 
Likewise, talk about top-down and bottom-up systems easily leads us to assume types of activities 
that do not take place in the brain. The more synaptic waystations there are between sensory input 
and motor output, and the more networks that get activated, the more varied are the possible 
responses for a given input, but the basic structure is still always a chain with feedback and 
feedforward loops, not a hierarchy.  
Any network within such a chain can of course be called the “top”, but a serious mistake is made, if 
it is conceptualised as something that is independent of input – somehow able to become activated 
“at need”. Such tops do not exist. This is because the activity of every single neuron at any given 
moment is a deterministic function of all incoming synaptic input*. The muddle becomes worse, 
when using dualistic expression like “a person can decide to X”, where X implies, that the “person” 
                                                          
* The trivial exceptions to this rule are sensory cells that react to whatever modality of energy or type of non-synaptic molecule they 
are attuned to. 
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is some qualitatively different entity that can affect brain network activities downstream without 
itself being fully determined by upstream activity. 
 
4.7 Why are emotions so central for the A-TRiC? 
The A-TRiC questionnaire focuses on emotional reactions both because emotions are upstream 
from behaviour and because emotions have a more central role in behaviour than is often assumed. 
Emotion precedes all complex action. People with damage to their ventromedial orbitofrontal 
cortex lack the emotional component of decision-making and are unable to make up their minds in 
the simplest of situations, despite being otherwise cognitively normal and quite able to verbalize the 
pros and cons of alternatives (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996).  
The human brain is superbly able to process conceptual information, but it is unable to cause action 
if the result of conceptual cogitations is not accompanied by an emotional reaction. Humans come 
to a virtual standstill when trying to decide on a rational basis only. Rationality comes second, as an 
afterthought. It may sway us in small things, when all relevant information can be held active in 
working memory, but decisions requiring massive parallel processing can only be made based on the 
emotions which the (unconscious) processing activates.  
When we let go of the old belief about rationality as a non-overlapping alternative to emotionality, 
this becomes self-evident: if no alternative feels even slightly better or worse than any other, how 
could we decide? Rationality allows us to process information, but it can never be the ultimate and 
only cause of behaviour. Emotions, therefore, make complex goal-directed behaviour possible and 
at the same time they restrict the repertoire of possible (or at least plausible) behaviours in a certain 
context. 
Since human brains can simulate situations and these simulations themselves arouse emotions, we 
can maintain long-term goals and motives. The simulations allow us to behave in ways that do not 
immediately produce positive experiences, as long as we believe they will make us end up in a 
situation that does. Naturally, the emotions aroused by the simulations depend on personality. 
Someone low on Independence and high on Trust is unlikely to feel motivated to work hard to be 
able to buy a cabin and live alone in the remote wilderness. 
Taking at face value the underlying assumptions of A-TRiC (see section 1.3.2) and understanding 
that there are no “tops” in the brain (see previous section) implies, that it is not possible for anyone 
to “control their emotions”. The fact that people differ in the threshold of activation and the 
acceleration of their emotional state, easily gives the impression there exists such a capability. If 
person A is low on Reactivity and B is very reactive, an outside observer (and person A, too) will 
36 
 
interpret B’s sensitivity to a situation where A remains calm as B’s inability to control his emotions 
when in fact the difference is in the magnitude and valence of emotions activated in each individual 
by the situation. If A would be put into a situation where his emotional state would match B’s, A 
could exert no more control than B in the first situation. The difference is in the innate thresholds 
of emotion activation, not in any ability to control emotions. 
A highly reactive person can no more stop himself from feeling anger when confronted, than a 
highly trusting person can stop himself from feeling joy at meeting a dear friend. It is therefore 
unhelpful to tell someone with high levels of Reactivity to just stay calm, as such a modification of 
emotional reactions is impossible. The only recourse is to modify the environment to better fit one’s 
personality; to avoid as best one can, situations where angers will flair and anxieties blossom. What 
makes these people less likely to encounter negative experiences and the repercussions in the form 
of chronic stress, depression, anxiety and substance abuse, may even go against much of that, which 
western society and psychotherapy deem to be good and desirable. 
That innate traits can produce so much personal suffering, is yet an example of how natural 
selection “cares” not for our happiness, only about genes getting passed on from generation to 
generation. Acknowledging all this could lead to increased understanding for people with “difficult” 
personalities and be liberating to those who are born with such personalities. Although they cannot 
will themselves to become Shiny Happy People, they can escape some of the suffering by adjusting 
their circumstances to keep away from the stimulus spaces that activate the worst of their character. 
 
4.8 On the temperament-personality dichotomy 
Temperament researchers, who mainly concentrate on infants, come close to describing traits akin 
to the A-TRiC (with the exception of Analytical Thinking, for obvious reasons). I believe this is 
because it is easier to view pre-linguistic infants as alien creatures and this gives the researchers a 
clearer view of the traits, unencumbered by introspective comparisons. Those who study adult 
personality easily become affected by the intricacies of their own subjective experience and that, 
which was rather simple and straightforward in infants, is assumed to be immensely complex in 
adults.  
I believe it is a mistake to think adult personality is made of more complex stuff than infant 
temperament. In fact, the most parsimonious assumption is, that there is no true difference between 
them, apart from gradual ontogenetic change in the way language and learning modulate how the 
traits manifest themselves in behaviour. The very human propensity to conjure up different reasons 
for our actions and reactions in different situations, causes the basic simplicity of the traits to 
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disappear from view. When the superficial complexities are ignored, however, temperament and 
personality become concepts with identical meaning. 
Personality could of course be broadened to include individual habits, schemas and different roles 
assumed in different social settings, but I believe that the scientific buck stops at inter-individual 
differences in emotional responses to specific input. Beyond that, idiosyncratic and culturally 
influenced behaviour take over, and while these are valuable objects of study in themselves, rather 
than belonging within the scope of personality alone, they are a function of individual personality 
and life history in a certain cultural setting. 
The temperament-personality dichotomy may survive also because researchers who try to associate 
traits with brain chemistry often call their object of study temperament, while those who approach the 
subject from a more behavioural vantage point, tend to call their object of study personality. But the 
difference is in the viewpoint, not the phenomenon they study. 
 
4.9 On validity 
The question whether the FFM/B5 traits exist, is not as straightforward as it may seem. The 
pragmatic answer is “Of course they exist – they are measured in psychology labs and businesses all 
over the world all the time”. This answer is correct when trait is shorthand for any cluster of items. 
In such a formative model, a trait is measured into existence – it is simply the sum of items, given a 
name. Using this definition of a trait, every test measuring it must be valid in the trivial sense of 
measuring “what it purports to measure” (Kelley, 1927, p. 14). In such a case, however, validity as a 
concept loses its meaning.  
But the FFM/B5 does not claim that its traits exist in this purely psychometric-epistemological 
sense. It is, like A-TRiC, a reflective model of the classical test theory ilk. Specifically, the FFM/B5 
claims that the five domains are actual entities that causally affect thirty actual entities, which in turn 
cause individually varied behaviours and ways of thinking and feeling that are measured with the 
questionnaire items. It sees traits as “biologically based properties of the individual” (McCrae & 
Costa, 2008, p. 278). 
True validity is ontological, not epistemological. Despite the multitude of validities in statistical 
parlance, it all boils down to accurate and reliable measurement of a construct that exists independently 
of the measurement (Borsboom, Mellenbergh & van Heerden, 2004). Psychometric methods can only 
corroborate or refute the existence of a trait as it has been defined. In the words of Borsboom et al. 
(2004, p. 1062): 
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“It is important to note that [..] the problem of validity cannot be solved by psychometric techniques 
or models alone. On the contrary, it must be addressed by substantive theory.”  
Therefore, the substantive theory of A-TRiC and its underlying assumptions have been outlined in 
this thesis and psychometric measures were applied only to test its operationalisation. 
 
4.10 Saving face by turning coats – the future of the FFM/B5 
The story of the FFM/B5 has evolved from humble beginnings, when the ambiguities and severe 
problems were honestly admitted, to an assertive hubris, where the model is seen as a true and 
comprehensive description of human personality. However, no substantive improvements in the 
model have taken place during that time. 
In the face of growing criticism, some FFM/B5 proponents have started leaning toward a formative 
interpretation, at least on the domain level. In 2017 Allik et al. stated that “NEO-PI-R is designed to 
measure 30 distinctive personality traits, which are grouped into Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness domains” (p. 402, emphasis added). Lately, even McCrae 
(2015) has suggested such a U-turn; instead of domains causing facets, he suggests that the domains’ 
existence is a result of facet covariances, i.e. a purely psychometric phenomenon. These suggestions 
are very different from the original claim, that domains are independent biological entities which 
cause variation in behaviour which can be grouped into facets. 
Some proponents of the FFM/B5 have recently distanced themselves from the claim that the 
FFM/B5 is a description of human personality, and instead demoted it to “a nearly universally 
accepted approach to explaining how individuals typically describe their own or somebody else's 
personality” (Allik, Hrebícková & Realo, 2018, p. 1, emphasis added). Among those who believe we 
are not measuring true personality with the FFM/B5 tests, many still wish to keep using them due to 
their perceived usefulness (e.g. Boag, 2011). This way of thinking made the Ptolemaic view of the 
solar system survive for centuries past its expiration date, being equipped with ever more complex 
equants and epicycles to accommodate for all the data contradicting it. Such resistance to change is 
very human, but it has no place in science. 
 
4.11 Finally 
My goal has been to show that psychology needs a credible, substantive theory on the structure of 
personality – one that is built on what we know about the evolutionary history of our species and 
about the brain. Due to methodological restrictions, very little is known about the brain processes 
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behind any conscious experiences, so we need not concern ourselves with the nuts and bolts of 
neuroanatomy and transmitter dynamics, yet. But we absolutely need to factor in issues of 
evolvability; what types of inter-individually varying reactivities could have evolved in us, given the 
phylogenetic constraints on brain evolution, given what is common among all mammals, and given 
our unique history since our lineage split from the other great apes and acquired unprecedented 
cognitive capacities, including conceptual thinking and language. 
That this thesis has included a critique of the prevailing model of personality, has been a conscious 
choice. It earns me no friends, but I share with Meehl the conviction, that scientific knowledge can 
only accumulate when old theories are dispassionately and explicitly abandoned when better ones 
are formulated (1978). Once there exists a situation, where the same phenomenon is described and 
explained by more than one theory, the whole field should concentrate on getting rid of them, until 
only the most parsimonious one remains. After that, no effort should be spared to formulate an 
even better one.  
The A-TRiC is a first attempt at a theory on human personality that takes into consideration the 
evolutionary history of our species and the phylogenetic constraints on the brain. Whether the A-
TRiC is right on target, partly correct, or completely wrong, time will hopefully tell. By far the worst 
fate that may befall the A-TRiC is that it is never put to the test, never attacked – just added to the 
long list of untested theories in psychology. 
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Appendix 1  
History of the Five-Factor Model and Big Five 
The official history of FFM/B5 is usually built along the following temporal storyline: Galton formulates the hypothesis 
that natural language contains the words for all important personality traits. Allport and Odbert excavate the trait words 
from amongst the half million entries in the Webster’s New Unabridged International Dictionary. Cattell and colleagues 
perform the Sisyphean feat of distilling out the truly focal adjectives by factor analysis and end up with twelve traits. 
Finally, several psychologists re-analyse Cattell’s data, and the number of traits narrows down to five. Ever since, the 
field is divided amicably between those preferring to use lists of adjectives to measure the Big Five and those inclined to 
use whole sentences describing everyday behaviours supposedly reflecting the underlying traits. The winner of minds 
and market shares is the FFM as operationalised by Costa and McCrae in the NEO PI-R. When zooming in a bit closer, 
a more complex picture emerges.  
Often the work of Cattell is left in the shadow of Allport and Odbert, as if he just crunched the numbers on the 4504 
terms Allport and Odbert had singled out as true trait words. In truth, his work was far more influential. First, on purely 
subjective grounds, Cattell rejected hundreds of the original adjectives as too vague and added a few hundred words he 
felt should be included (Cattell, 1943). A literary student and a psychologist were then given the task to form clusters of 
synonyms from these words, and finally they converged on around two hundred clusters (Cattell, 1943). As the clusters 
“passed continuously one into another” (Cattell, 1943, p. 488), the trio collectively decided where the “natural nuclei” of 
the clouds of words were located, with right of veto for Cattell. This is the second instance of subjective modification of 
the original list of words. 
Most traits were defined by clusters of opposites. This presented a third instance, where subjective choices by Cattell 
played a critical part, as the poles forming the opposites were inherently ambiguous. In Cattell’s words: “Is the opposite 
of bullying, sadistic, etc., to be considered as just nonbullying or as protective or as masochistic? Is impulsive the 
opposite of self-controlled or of phlegmatic?” (Cattell, 1943, p. 489). 
Finally, Cattell had narrowed down the number of categories to around 160 with an average 13.4 adjectives per category. 
He now added clinical terminology coined during the past hundred years, and also ten specific cognitive abilities. In the 
end, he had a list of 171 mostly bipolar trait descriptors, beginning with Alert vs Absent-minded and ending in Worrying 
vs Placid (Cattell, 1943). 
In the first study, this list was used for peer ratings by a hundred men. Cattell enthused about being able to avoid the 
homogeneity of typical samples marked by “overrepresentation of intelligent, professional, and indeed academic types”, 
as his sample contained “domestic servants, janitors, artisans, a lumber jack, a Nova Scotian fisherman, and so on” 
(Cattell, 1943, p. 497). The resulting correlation matrix, four by four meters in size, was analysed by grouping adjectives 
into clusters where correlations were at least .45 between all elements. His aim was to locate 30-40 clusters that together 
contained all 171 trait terms, as a higher number of clusters would have been impossible to factor analyse in those days. 
Even after having cleaned the material of more than 95% of the original trait descriptors, he had no such luck:  
"The ideal cluster, as a set of highly intercorrelating variables, each of which is far more highly correlated with 
its fellow cluster members than with any outside variable, does not exist in nature. One deals rather with a 
continuous, straggling network of large and small and more or less overlapping clusters." (Cattell, 1943, p. 498) 
Instead of a neat collection of 30-40 clusters including all adjectives, Cattell ended up with “a few” clusters with 6-12 
adjectives, 15 with five adjectives, 20 with four and 88 consisting of three adjectives with correlations of at least .45 
(Cattell, 1943). 135 of the original 171 adjectives were included in these clusters. Four of the rejected 36 adjectives were 
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included in their closest three-member clusters due to their “importance”, despite lower correlation (Cattell, 1943). For 
the factor analysis, Cattell neglected some smaller clusters, combined clusters with large overlap in correlations and 
chose from the reminder only those “already confirmed by other researchers” (Cattell, 1945, p. 71). Now he had 35 
cluster variables, which 208 men used to rate their peers with. After factor analysis of the results Cattell ended up with 
12 traits (Cattell, 1945). 
Choosing 22 of these 35 cluster variables, Fiske (1949) found five factors. A closer look at the results from his three 
samples (1949) reveals a different picture. If we apply the condition that a variable must have a loading of >.3 on its 
main factor and to not have cross-loadings that are within |.29| of its main factor loading, it becomes apparent that 
none of the factors had any variables in common in all three studies (Figure 4). Factor C had no variable loadings filling 
that requirement, while factor E did have two variables, but in only one of the three samples.  
 
Figure 4. Factor matrices from three samples for five factor solution with 22 of Cattell's 35 variables. Reprinted from 
“Consistency of the factorial structures of personality ratings from different sources.” By D. W. Fiske, 1949, Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 44, 334. Copyright 2018 by the American Psychological Association. 
 
Tupes and Christal (1961) chose 30 of 35 Cattellian variables for their study, and now the pattern of loadings did 
resemble the later Big Five. They named the factors (highest loading trait words in parentheses) Surgency (talkativeness, 
assertiveness, adventurousness), Agreeableness (good-natured, lack of jealousy, emotionally mature), Conscientiousness 
(orderliness, responsibility, conscientiousness), Emotional Stability (not neurotic, placid, not hypochondriacal), Culture 
(artistic, culture, polished). Importantly, Tupes and Christal (1961) only ever looked for five traits, neither more nor less, 
so there is no information on whether any other solution had fit the data better. From here on, the five factors were 
taken for granted, and only such variables chosen, that supported this structure (Norman, 1963; Digman & Takemoto-
Chock, 1981). 
The only underlying assumption behind FFM/B5 is, that trait words in language, when used by people to describe 
themselves and others, will reveal through factor analysis the nature of the traits that make up human personality. 
Throughout the process of looking for the traits, however, several purely subjective decisions were made by 
psychologists as to which words should be included and discarded; how to place the “centres” of the traits; which 
opposite poles the trait continua stretched between, etc. These subjective decisions are critical for the simple reason that 
the FFM/B5 does not have any (other) theoretical basis. It stands (and falls) with the lexical hypothesis, so picking and 
choosing among trait words is not an option, unless one chooses to discard the lexical hypothesis also. 
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The theoretical problems with the lexical approach are addressed in 1.2, but even assuming its validity, it is clear, that any 
traits that appear are absolutely determined by the available words/items that subjects are given. As Peabody and 
Goldberg put it: 
“The selection of variables is clearly of critical importance, serving to determine the very presence of a factor, 
as well as its size and content. Indeed, the selection of variables is the method used to establish particular 
personality characteristics.” (Peabody & Goldberg, 1989, p. 553). 
When trait words are subjectively chosen according to professional hunches and with the purpose of giving a clean 
structure based on earlier results from factor analyses, such a structure is bound to keep appearing in the future, too. 
There is no reason, on these grounds, to believe it reflects human universal personality. Early proponents of the 
FFM/B5 emphatically state, that they do not believe the lexical taxonomy reveals the true structure of personality (Fiske, 
1949; Tupes & Christal, 1961; Norman, 1963), but as the messy beginnings of the FFM/B5 disappeared in the haze of 
history, certainty grew among the younger generation, until they were ready to pronounce their model a comprehensive 
and valid description of universal human personality (e.g. McCrae, 2002). 
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Appendix 2 The questionnaire 
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